Hermann Conring’s Early Modern Political Science and Public Law

This project has been running for several years as part of Associate Editor responsibilities for The Cambridge Reader in the History of Western Political Thought. It has included several translations from Latin to English as well as additionally supplementary materials related to political Aristotelianism that will eventually be integrated into Volume Two. More details on this role and the Cambridge project can be found under those sections in the Research tab.
Project Overview
Part of my research to date has investigated how early modern thinkers conceptualised and practically addressed the extreme human suffering wrought by confessional warfare in the Holy Roman Empire – establishing how institutional and legal frameworks were forged to alleviate historical catastrophe. I have examined how the cataclysmic crisis of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) was mitigated through the transformation of religious conflict into German public law.[1] The original right to reformation, granted to the territorial lord in 1555, had weaponised confession. But the ensuing catastrophic devastation led to a conceptual and institutional pivot. Article V of the Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (1648) resolved the denominational question, legal and political structures being consciously redesigned to stem the tide of inter-communal affliction, making toleration and conscience legal principles. Tracing this historical trajectory discloses a story of serried efforts to alleviate the systemic suffering of a fractured political order and reconcile the inward dimension with the external order of law and the state. This was a pragmatic, human-scale effort to make a broken world better through active legal, institutional, and philosophical reconstruction.[2]
Yet this broad historical approach – which culminated in German Idealism – had a critical prehistory in the foundational workshop of public law and early modern political science. It is precisely this granular prehistory that animates this project, which recovers Hermann Conring’s (1606–81) political science as a powerfully penetrating intellectual instrument for grasping the deep structural tensions that held the early modern state together – as an inescapable necessity and as a saving element against ruin. Worlds apart from the later natural law systems or absolute idealism, Conring responded to the politics of his time by developing a philosophically rationalist doctrine of the state, politics, and public law. His thought stands at the beginning of an axial shift away from the tradition of politics, ethics, and an Aristotelian-oriented form of natural law towards a technical science of the state.[3] Yet, his insistence on treating political science and law as instruments also reflected a defensive psychological strategy. In this respect, personal biography influenced the development of his legal and political theory – if not, as some have claimed, the drift of his philosophical scepticism.[4] More than others, Conring’s thought was marked by an acute sensitivity to the threat of open armed conflict as well as the fear over the fragility of the Westphalian compromise.[5] His response to internecine religious conflict saw the elevation of the territorial state, the sovereignty of the ruler over administration, and – in the truly exceptional case – equity over law. In the crucible of early modern German politics, human psychology and political science interfused.
By reducing politics to a technology of administration, Conring advised powerful patrons without surrendering his intellectual integrity or falling prey to the dogmatic orthodoxies of his day. Ideologically, he charted a middle course. He went against the imperialists who wanted the emperor to have the ius belli and dismissed the radical territorialists, like Bogislaw Philipp von Chemnitz (1605–78), who strove for the princes to have it entirely. By placing power principally or chiefly (praecipue) in the deliberative element of the Imperial Diet (senatus), Conring elevated the German princes and Imperial Estates to ‘senators’ of a great republic.[6] He effectively shackled the emperor (who could not go to war without the Diet) while simultaneously bridling the princes (who had to act through the Diet for the common good and could not go to war against emperor or Empire).[7] Thus, haunted by the persistent threat that the fragile peace might yet unravel into fresh catastrophe and total war, Conring defended a normative blueprint for the post-Westphalian imperial order in the statutes of German public law that had just been codified in the great treaties through the conceptual lens of Aristotle’s Politics.
Rather than resting on moral science (scientia), the state is forged out of empirical reality and factual knowledge (notitia): human suffering and vulnerability engender the very necessity for a sovereign public legal order capable of mitigating collective tragedy. Because human actions are various while statutory commands are general, strict laws inevitably fail when confronted with changing circumstances, leaving societies exposed to systemic catastrophe. To bridge this gap, Conring understood equity (aequitas) not as a violation of justice, but as a deliberate, meliorist tool of sovereign intervention:[8] ‘For this reason, most matters on which any state whatsoever is dependent cannot be judged by the strict measure of the morally right and morally wrong. This is because they are actually of a different nature’.[9] Hence, Conring defined the justice of public law through the ratio status, which he rendered in Latin as ‘reipublicae ratio’ or – and even more to the point – as ‘commodum publicum’ (the public interest).[10] He argued that because ‘each individual appearance of commonwealth rests individually upon its own unique principles and remedies’,[11] the law must be tailored to the state ‘so constituted as it stands in the present’.[12] Where legal justice fails due to its universality, the sovereign intervenes on behalf of the public interest, altering or setting aside enactments as shifting conditions demand.[13]
From this perspective, law was ‘a rule of human conduct determined in advance by sovereignty’[14] – a rule that could be prorogued by the ruler in the name of a higher ethical order to mitigate extreme systemic affliction or for the practical necessities of the ‘commodum publicum’. The early modern state was thus held together by a profound structural tension: a pragmatic technology born from human frailty and the threat of suffering, yet soteriological in its ultimate design – a paradox that still resonates, reminding us that the institutional conditions for a peaceable society do not magically pre-exist, but must be forged through the hard-won legal architecture of political science. In other words, the state as a stable entity ruled by law does not arise from a discourse free of domination, but rather creates the very conditions that make such discourse possible in the first place.
[1] Nathaniel Boyd, ‘Pufendorf on Confessional Strife and Interstate Relations’, in Peter Schröder (ed.), Pufendorf’s International Political and Legal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 23–40, at 23–8.
[2] Nathaniel Boyd, Hegel and German Public Law (London: Bloomsbury, 2026), 167–82.
[3] Reinhold Zehrfeld, Hermann Conrings (1606–1681) Staatenkunde. Ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Statistik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Conringschen Bevölkerungslehre (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1926); Arno Seifert, Cognitio Historica. Die Geschichte als Namengeberin der frühneuzeitlichen Empirie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976).
[4] Hanns Gross, Empire and Sovereignty: A History of the Public Law Literature in the Holy Roman Empire (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), 256 – referencing Ernest von Moeller, Hermann Conring. Der Vorkämpfer des deutschen Rechts (Hanover: E. Geibel, 1915), 1–5.
[5] Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 129, 141. The contrast is made with Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94), a generation younger and ‘further along the road to self-confidence’ than Conring. Forever cautious of publicly declaring his judgement, Conring kept a great deal of himself hidden. In this reticence, he fully grasped ‘it is but one short step to the man whose judgment was for sale’.
[6] Hermann Conring, Dissertatio philosophica de legibus (Helmstedt: Henning Müller, 1666), Thesis XXX uses ‘praecipue’ as a Latin functional equivalent of Aristotle’s Greek ‘κυριώτατον’. See Politics, IV.11, 1298a5: ‘the deliberative factor is most sovereign’ (κυριώτατον).
[7] For these details, see I.P.O. VIII. §2.
[8] See Conring, Dissertatio philosophica de legibus, Thesis XXXVIII and XXXIX. He draws his analysis from Nicomachean Ethics, V.10 1137b28–30.
[9] Conring, Dissertatio philosophica de legibus, Thesis XXI: ‘Quamobrem pleraque, quibus respubl. nititur quaelibet, non ad rigidam illam honesti aut inhonesti queunt amussim exigi, quandoquidem scilicet alterius sunt naturae…’.
[10] Hermann Conring, De civili prudentia liber unus (Helmstedt: Henning Müller, 1662), 5–23.
[11] Ibid., 11: ‘singulae rerumpublicarum species seorsim suis quaeque principiis ac remediis nituntur’.
[12] Ibid., 10: ‘qualis ea in praesenti est’.
[13] Conring, Dissertatio philosophica de legibus, Thesis XXVII.
[14] Hermann Conring, Dissertatio de legibus (Helmstedt: Henning Müller, 1643), Thesis III (original italics): ‘regula humanarum actionum, a majestate praescripta’.
Objectives and Outputs
‘The History of Toleration as Ecumenical Reason of State’, in Peter Schröder and Samuel Zeitlin (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2028).
This commissioned chapter uses the Helmstedt circle – specifically Conring and his irenic colleague, the theologian Georg Calixt (1586–1656) – as a diagnostic lens to examine a broader European shift: how the systemic suffering of religious warfare was translated into public law. Bridging Aristotle, Baroque humanism, Jesuit political thought, and Spanish jurisprudence, it shows how inter-confessional political science forged an ecumenical reason of state out of the crisis of confessional coercion.
Peer-reviewed article and critical editions of Dissertatio de legibus and Dissertatio philosophica de legibus.
The translations are already in advanced stages with running commentary. They trace the evolution of Conring’s political science, capturing a profound intellectual pivot from law as a historically found tradition to law as an active instrument of sovereign command. The peer-reviewed article constructs the historical-contextual analysis, studying how the texts register the shifting psychological and political landscape. The 1643 dissertation responded to the immediate devastation of war, while the 1666 text, written almost two decades into the peace, was driven by the anxious dread of Westphalia’s collapse.
‘Natural Law’, in Douglas Moggach (ed.), Cambridge Companion to German Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2029).
This chapter retells the story of German natural law, challenging the entrenched historiographical binaries that have dominated the field – from Franz Wieacker’s (1908–94) dogmatic split between empirical and metaphysical schools and Knud Haakonssen’s canonical mapping to Ian Hunter’s civil-metaphysical dichotomies – by treating the discipline instead as a complex, evolving variation on a theme.
Arguing that isolating rigid schools is an artificial imposition, the chapter begins by recovering a rich lineage bypassed by Hunter’s preferential focus on what he terms ‘secularising’ civil philosophy, which artificially isolates figures like Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). It shows how Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) drew on medieval natural law, Thomism, and the School of Salamanca, while Hermann Conring (1606–81) kept this horizon in view by reading Aristotle in Greek to criticise Scholasticism. On the one hand, the chapter maps how natural law emerged as a ‘neutral’ institutional antidote to civil strife. On the other hand, it demonstrates how this was thoroughly forged through inter-confessional dialogue and lay theology in the republic of letters – tracing a critical pivot toward an early modern science of the state where theology, jurisprudence, and reason formed a mutually reinforcing whole.


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